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awareness of the cue  
(Supplemental Experimental 
Procedures) [5]. Subjective reports 
are critical to assess conscious 
experience [5,6]. 
Only trials on which observers 
were fully unaware of the cue — for 
example, trials with ‘1’ rating on 
the 1–4 awareness scale — were 
included in the analyses across 
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Working memory allows individuals 
to maintain information in the focus 
of the mind’s eye in the service of 
goal-directed behavior. Current 
psychological theories (for example, 
Baddeley’s influential model of 
working memory) [1], computational 
models [2] and neurobiological 
accounts of working memory are 
based on the assumption that 
working memory operates on 
consciously represented information. 
Models of the capacity limits of 
working memory [3] are silent  
on this issue. While there has been 
some suggestion that working 
memory may be engaged by 
incidental exposure to visible items 
[4], current understanding indicates 
that the encoding of information 
in working memory, maintenance, 
retrieval and use in decision making 
of working memory operate on the 
contents of consciousness. But 
no study to date has investigated 
working memory processing for 
unconscious information. Here we 
show that observers can encode a 
subliminal orientation cue, maintain 
it ‘on-line’ even in the presence 
of visible distracters, and perform 
above chance in subsequent explicit 
discrimination, namely, whether a 
supraliminal orientation probe was 
tilted clockwise or counter-clockwise 
relative to the earlier unconscious 
cue. Our findings challenge the 
currently held view that working 
memory processes are contingent  
on conscious awareness.
Observers were presented with 
a brief (16.67 ms) and masked 
orientation Gabor cue followed by 
a delay period and a subsequent 
Gabor test. They were encouraged to 
attend and hold the cue in memory 
even if they could not consciously 
perceive it and perform explicit 
cue-target orientation discrimination 
(Figure 1A; see also the Supplemental 
Experimental Procedures in the 
Supplemental Information). Following 
this, observers gave subjective 
ratings, on a scale of 1–4, for their 
experiments. A first experiment 
showed that discrimination 
performance on unaware trials was 
above chance (50%; t(6) = 4.01; 
p = 0.006; two tailed; Figure 1B). 
Experiments 1–3 also included 
catch trials where the initial cue  
was absent (50% of trials) to 
calculate an objective measure  
of cue sensitivity (see below). 
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Figure 1. Evidence for working memory without conscious awareness.
(A) Example of the sequence of events during an experimental trial; see below for further 
details. (B) Memory accuracy across the four Experiments on trials where participants were 
unaware of memory cue (response 1 on the cue awareness scale). A total of twenty-five 
healthy volunteers (10 males, mean age: 23 years) were recruited. The study conformed to the 
ethical standards set in the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants provided informed consent 
and received monetary compensation for their participation. Experiment 1 (n = 7), Experiment 
2 (n = 7) and Experiment 3 (n = 9) used naïve participants. Experiment 4 (n = 9) used seven 
participants from Experiment 1 and two new participants (the mean performance for the old 
and new participants in this experiment was similar, namely, 56% for the old and 57.5% for 
the new participants). The memory cue was a grating contrast with a 0.1 Michelson contrast 
(spatial frequency: 1 cycle/deg) and could be tilted 10, 40, 70, 100, 130 or 160 deg from the 
vertical. Its diameter was 3.8 deg of visual angle from a viewing distance of 57 cm. Its duration 
was 16.67 in Experiments 1–3 and 16.67 or 216.67 ms in Experiment 4. After a delay period 
(two seconds in Experiments 1 and 4; five seconds in Experiments 2 and 3) there followed a 
test stimulus that could be tilted 30 degrees either clockwise or anticlockwise relative to the 
memory cue. Participants were asked to indicate the direction of the tilt. They were then asked 
to provide a rating of the awareness of the memory cue using the scale: 1, did not see anything; 
2, maybe saw something; 3, saw the stimulus but not its orientation; 4, saw the stimulus and 
its orientation [5]. The proportion of trials for each rating is given in Table S1B. In Experiments 
2 and 3, a distracter was presented during the five second delay period. Also Experiments 1–3 
contained 50% of catch trials on which no memory cue was presented and the probability of 
hits and false alarms computed to derive a measure of perceptual sensitivity (d’) on ‘1’ rating 
trials; the ‘signal’ was defined as the absence of the cue and the ‘noise’ as the presence of the 
cue. Thus, ‘1’ rating responses when the cue was absent were labeled as hits and the same 
responses when the cue was present were labeled as false alarms in order to compute d’.
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In Experiment 2, we asked 
whether observers could maintain 
the unconscious Gabor cue in the 
presence of a distracter Gabor. 
Experiment 2 included an intervening 
visible orientation Gabor distracter 
(its duration was 216.67 ms followed 
by a mask) presented during the 
cue-test delay (Figure 1A). Distracters 
could have the same orientation 
(congruent) or opposite orientation 
(incongruent) relative to the cue. To 
ensure that participants attended 
to the distracter we included 20% 
of trials with vertical distracters 
that participants had to report via 
button press (mean correct: 94%). 
Discrimination was above chance 
in both incongruent and congruent 
conditions (t(6 )= 3.52; p = 0.012 and 
t(6) = 2.99; p = 0.024; Figure 1B), 
suggesting that the representation 
of the initial subliminal Gabor cue 
could be maintained ‘online’ in the 
presence of a visible distracter of 
similar physical features. Experiment 
3 included brief and masked 
intervening distracters (16.67 ms 
duration followed by a mask). 
Evidence suggests that masked, even 
invisible, distracters can interfere 
more with ongoing processing than 
visible counterparts [7]. We ensured 
that participants attended to the 
masked distracters by introducing 
catch trials where the mask changed 
to a bigger size (mean correct 
detection = 98%). Discrimination 
remained above chance on unaware 
trials, both in incongruent (t(8) = 2.7; 
p = 0.027) and congruent trials  
(t(8) = 3.71; p = 0.006). 
Psychophysical analyses of 
perceptual sensitivity do not 
inform whether or not stimuli reach 
conscious awareness but they 
allowed us to learn that observers 
had poor sensitivity of the cue  
(mean d′ on ‘1’ rating trials  
across Experiments 1–3 = 0.297; 
p(Hit) = 0.557; p(False Alarm) = 0.441; 
Supplemental Table S1A). Across 
Experiments 1–3 there was no 
correlation between cue sensitivity 
and memory discrimination 
(Supplemental Figure S1; Pearson 
correlation = –0.18, p = 0.41). Also, 
there were no differences in d′ across 
different task blocks (Ps > 0.2), 
indicating that perceptual sensitivity 
of the Gabor cue was not affected 
by the amount of training on the 
task. Critically, a linear regression 
analysis following Greenwald [8] with 
d′ as predictor and discrimination as 
the predicted variable showed that 
the intercept for the discrimination 
equation remained above chance 
(intercept = 60%) at the point where 
d′ = 0. Memory discrimination 
dissociated from perceptual 
awareness.
Experiment 4 presented observers 
with two brief Gabor cues; following 
a delay of 2 seconds, a test Gabor 
appeared at the location of one of 
the preceding cues and observers 
were to report its orientation relative 
to the cue at that location. The two 
cues could appear for 16.67 or 216.67 
ms, followed by a mask. Observers 
were instructed that cues could be 
easy or hard to see. We included 
visible cues to ensure that observers 
attempted to maintain the two items in 
working memory throughout the trials. 
Discrimination in the visible condition 
was good (Mean correct = 81%) and 
remained above chance in the 16.67 
ms exposure on unaware trials (t(8) 
= 2.97, p = 0.018). Thus, even in the 
absence of conscious awareness, 
working memory can exhibit the 
capacity to hold more than one item 
at a time.
These findings demonstrate that 
visual memory can encode, maintain 
and access unconscious items for 
explicit discrimination goals. This 
effect can not be accounted for by 
unconscious priming mechanisms 
because: (i) the unconscious cue 
could be maintained for subsequent 
discrimination even in the presence 
of visible distracters which should 
have overwritten the unconscious 
cue according to priming accounts; 
(ii) the effect was observed with  
cue-target delays of up to five 
seconds; this contrasts with the 
short-lived unconscious priming 
effects typically observed with 
prime-target intervals of around 
100–200 ms [9]; (iii) our task required 
explicit working memory-guided cue-
target discrimination which is difficult 
to account for based on passive 
priming. 
Our findings challenge the current 
conceptualization of working memory 
as operating on the contents of 
consciousness, which must therefore 
be expanded in future computational 
frameworks to incorporate the role 
of unconscious processing. While 
prior research has demonstrated that 
visual selection and awareness may 
be dissociated [6,10], our evidence 
for working memory processing 
on the basis of subliminal cues, 
even when attention resources are 
constrained by distracters, suggest 
that working memory may operate 
in a rather autonomous fashion 
independently of both conscious 
awareness and attention. Further 
research ought to elucidate the 
neural basis of this intriguing 
phenomenon.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information contains one 
Figure, one Table and Supplemental  
Experimental Procedures and can be  
found with this article online at  
doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2011.09.049.
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